NAWRM9

Legislation Committee No 1

Response to the Consultation on the Proposed Measure in Relation to the Independent Review Panel Recommendation

Dr Jonathan Bradbury, Department of Political and Cultural Studies, Swansea University

1. Is there a need for an independent National Assembly for Wales Remuneration Board?

1. Broadly, I would like to support the creation of an independent National Assembly for Wales Remuneration Board.  Where control over the setting of remuneration is still in the hands of Parliamentarians there remain distinct problems with respect to agreeing remuneration packages that inspire public confidence.  The UK, but also to a lesser extent Germany, bears witness to the problems of this situation.  In Canada a series of accounting scandals over the use of allowances led to reforms at both federal and provincial levels during the last decade.  This has led to remuneration being set by independent boards at different levels of government, and new accounting systems being introduced based on the clerk as the chief accounting officer.  These systems have as far as possible re-inspired public trust and it appears to me right that the National Assembly among other elected parliaments and assemblies in the UK should seek to set up an independent remuneration board.  

2. Do you think the key provisions within the proposed Measure will help deliver the aim of providing an open and transparent process for determining Assembly Members’ salaries which will instil public confidence?

2. There are nevertheless issues which appear to me worthy of more deliberation regarding the provisions in the measure for setting up the independent board.  Section 4 and schedule 2 appear to leave a good deal of discretion to the Assembly Commission as to who is to be appointed to the board and how they are to be appointed.  Generally the section and schedule currently appear in need of bolstering to suggest that a truly independent board would be set up.  Schedule 1 says only who is to be disqualified from the board.  Schedule 2 could say rather more about what qualifies potential members, and here the legislation could draw guidance from ideas of Nolan principles, and presumably from experience on creating independent boards in such cases as the Canadian provinces.  

3. What are the practical implications of the proposed Measure, in particular do you think there are any potential barriers to implementing the provisions contained in the proposed Measure?

3. Section 12 is also worthy of more deliberation as it ties the proposed Independent National Assembly for Wales Remuneration Board to the presumption that it should generally follow the recommendations of the Independent Review 'Getting it Right’ in making its decisions. Section 12, subsection 2 states that if the Board ever departs from 'Getting it Right’ it will need to say so in writing, presumably underlining the fact that this is not expected to happen often.  This is deeply unfortunate as for example, the arguments in Getting it Right (pages 52-53) that the Independent Board should depart from relating approaches to remuneration to decisions taken at the UK level are weak.  No clear evidence is really presented as to why the link should be broken.  Indeed in a highly integrated British public space, where media comment and public perceptions are not separated between British and Welsh level political discussion of these issues, it is a highly pertinent point that remuneration packages at different levels are likely to fall into disrepute if they are not seen to be, if not automatically linked, proportionate across the levels.  

Equally the discussion of setting salaries (pp55-59) appears problematic.  I can see arguments for an approach that relates salary rises to average income rises rather than to the pay of certain sets of state employees, such as judges.  Indeed this has enjoyed more support in Canada.  But it appears rooted in the atmosphere of a particular period of debate about salaries, and is problematic if it does not do the job in recruiting good representatives, or maintaining public confidence.  The Getting it Right appendix nine is problematic for reproducing a table from the Baker Review and therefore providing little information on regional/provincial level approaches.  

It is also problematic in binding the Independent Remuneration Board to leave out of consideration what 'Getting it Right’ wanted left out of consideration.  An example is remuneration for constituency and list members, which in the National Assembly has since 1999 been made on an equal footing, both in terms of salaries and allowances.  This is not true of all MMP electoral systems.  For example, in New Zealand list members receive lower allowances reflecting the expectation of lesser local constituency representation roles.  Research in Wales indicates that there should be no criticism of AMs and their approach to their representative roles, but that the constituency roles of list members are nevertheless smaller, warranting a reasonable case for considering whether constituency allowances ought to be the same for constituency and list members.  I am not particularly saying that they should be but it is an example of an issue of legitimate public interest and one that the Board should be allowed to consider, or make recommendation on if it wishes to in due course.  

Generally, I would like to see written into the Measure in section 12 some wording that stiffens the independence of the Remuneration Board, and gets a better balance between its need to take due account of a review endorsed by Assembly debate and its own autonomy to consider issues regarding remuneration and raise issues for Assembly and public consideration.  

4. What are the financial implications of the proposed Measure?

4. This may not be necessary for the Measure but I found myself looking for provisions which clarified the relationship between the Remuneration Board and the system of financial accounting.